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1 Introduction
In the complete information setting, the core provides a natural way of for-
malizing coalitional stability. Simple as the core concept is, there is no
unique, unambiguous way of extending it to an exchange economy with in-
complete information at the interim stage; see Forges, Minelli and Vohra [6]
for a survey. This paper is concerned with the issue of making endogenous the
amount of information that agents share in the process of cooperation. We
shall formalize coalitional stability by means of equilibria of voting games in
which agents choose between the status-quo and another feasible alternative.
At the interim stage, there are two sets of assumptions to be made
(amount of information sharing, and whether or not incentive constraints
are imposed) before the standard definition of the core can be extended to
the incomplete information model. For example, we may assume that there
is no sharing of information; agents in a coalition can only rely on common
knowledge events to construct potential objections. This approach leads to
the notion of the coarse core, first formalized by Wilson [17] in a framework
without incentive constraints, and subsequently extended by Vohra [15] to
include them. The main idea underlying the coarse core, namely that a
coalition’s objection is focused on a common knowledge event, is motivated
by standard issues of adverse selection; see the examples in Wilson [17] and
Vohra [15].
Not surprisingly, the theory is quite different if one allows coalition mem-
bers to share information. If information sharing is unrestricted among the
members of a coalition, one arrives at the notion of the fine core, also pro-
posed by Wilson [17]. Incentive constraints can be added to a fine objection
by requiring that it be incentive compatible over the event that is relevant for
the objection. While unrestricted sharing of information may seem arbitrary
and, in many instances, unreasonable, there do exist cases in which some
amount of information sharing seems natural.
Our aim is to make endogenous the amount of information that is shared
among agents when a coalition forms in order to block a status-quo alloca-
tion.1 While this concern is by no means new (see, for example, Dutta and
Vohra [4]), our approach here is based on viewing the core in another, more
positive (perhaps more primitive) way. We argue that non-cooperative equi-
1Our approach is related to the notions of durability in Holmstro¨m and Myerson [7]
and credibility in Dutta and Vohra [4], as we shall discuss below.
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librium theory is ideally suited to deal with the question of how much private
information agents transmit to each other. This is so even though we are
interested in modeling cooperative behavior.2 This leads to the idea of for-
malizing coalitional stability by making use of non-cooperative equilibrium
behavior in a voting game.
Suppose a status-quo allocation is in the core, and a coalition compares
it to some other feasible allocation. Clearly, if the two alternatives were
to be voted upon by the agents in the coalition, we would not expect a
unanimous acceptance of the alternative over the status-quo. Indeed, in the
complete information setting this is a defining property of the core. We
take this simple test of stability and apply it systematically to a model with
incomplete information. The amount of information sharing as well as the
incentive constraints will then emerge as equilibrium conditions of a voting
game.
One might think that precise details of the voting game may turn out to
be critical, perhaps leading to a plethora of different notions of core stability.
Fortunately, we are able to show that this is not the case; the coalitional
voting approach is quite sharp in its conclusions, and there are only several
important aspects of the voting game that matter for core stability, leading to
very few possible core concepts. Indeed, a version of the revelation principle
is at work, as a Bayesian equilibrium of an arbitrary voting mechanism can
be replaced by its outcome-equivalent truthful equilibrium in a direct voting
game, where the message simply consists of a type report and a “yes-no”
vote to the alternative. Thus, while information transmission is endogenous
in the Bayesian equilibrium actions of non-cooperative voting games, it is
also robust to different specifications of their details.
If incentive constraints are not important (because types become verifi-
able) we show that the coalitional voting approach yields the fine core of
Wilson [17] as the natural concept. In the general case where types are not
verifiable, resilience to coalitional voting yields the credible core of Dutta
and Vohra [4]. In this sense, the credible core can be seen as the appropriate
generalization of the fine core when incentive constraints are relevant (as will
be explained, the credible core is not simply the incentive compatible fine
core described above).
2While the ability to cooperate makes it reasonable to allow for unfettered, frictionless
communication, it does not mean that agents will necessarily share their private informa-
tion with others or believe others’ claims that cannot be verified.
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An interesting modification of this simple voting game allows a mediator
to construct a more sophisticated challenge to a status-quo by implementing
the alternative as a function of the agents’ reported types. Effectively, the
only difference between this game and the simpler one corresponding to the
credible core is that in this case a coalition can challenge a status-quo over
an informational event that is not necessarily a product event. We call the
corresponding set of resilient allocations the mediated core. The importance
of the product/non-product structure of the event over which an objection
takes place justifies the following analogy: a mediated objection is to a cred-
ible objection as a correlated equilibrium is to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we allow a mediator to randomize over the coalitions that it
approaches for a vote. This leads to a form of resilience that yields the
randomized mediated core, a notion that corresponds closely with a recent
core concept suggested by Myerson [11]. Myerson’s approach is based on
virtual utility, and he is able to prove non-emptiness of his core concept in his
class of games, provided that severance payments take place in an additional
commodity, a nummeraire, and feasibility is only required in expected terms.
It follows from our results that his non-emptiness result also implies non-
emptiness of the core concepts found here under his assumptions, since the
blocking restrictions that define the mediated core and the credible core are
less stringent than those in Myerson’s. On the other hand, we also know that
the non-emptiness question in general is difficult, given the results in Forges,
Mertens and Vohra [5] and Vohra [15], showing that the incentive compatible
coarse core, a superset of all these other concepts, may be empty.
2 Preliminaries
The basic model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information can
be formulated as follows. Let Ti denote the (finite) set of agent i’s types.
The interpretation is that ti ∈ Ti denotes the private information possessed
by agent i. With N = {1, . . . , n} as the finite set of agents, let T = ∏i∈N Ti
denote the set of all information states. We will use the notation t−i to denote
(tj)j 6=i. Similarly T−i =
∏
j 6=i Tj, TS =
∏
j∈S Tj and T−S =
∏
j /∈S Tj. We
assume that agents have a common prior probability distribution q defined
on T , and that no type is redundant, i.e., q(ti) > 0 for all ti ∈ Ti for all i.
At the interim stage, nature chooses t ∈ T , and each agent i knows her type,
ti. Hence, conditional probabilities will be important: for each i ∈ N and
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ti ∈ Ti, the conditional probability of t−i ∈ T−i, given ti is denoted q(t−i | ti).
We assume that there are a finite number of commodities, and that the
consumption set of agent i is Xi ⊆ Rl+. Agent i’s utility function in state t is
denoted ui(·, t) : Xi× T 7→ R. We shall assume that ui(x, t) ≥ ui(0, t) for all
i, all t ∈ T and all x ∈ Xi. The endowment of agent i of type ti is ωi ∈ Xi
(assumed to be independent of the state – with this assumption, all private
information concerns agents’ preferences and beliefs.)
We can now define an exchange economy as E = 〈(ui, Xi, ωi, Ti)i∈N , q〉.
For coalition S ⊆ N , a feasible (state contingent) S-allocation, x : T 7→
Rls (where s denotes the cardinality of S), consists of a commodity bundle
for each consumer in S in each state such that ∑i∈S xi(t) ≤
∑
i∈S ωi for
all t ∈ T , and satisfying that x(tS, t′−S) = x(tS, t′′−S) for all tS ∈ TS and
for all t′−S, t′′−S ∈ T−S. (The latter assumption is made to exclude basic
externalities across coalitions, i.e., the set of feasible allocations to a coalition
is independent of the information held by the complement). We will denote
by AS the set of feasible state contingent allocations of S. Thus, we shall use
AS to denote the set of feasible allocations in a given state: AS = {(xi) ∈∏
i∈S Xi|
∑
i∈S xi ≤
∑
i∈S ωi}. Similarly, state contingent N -allocations are
simply referred to as allocations, and the set of state contingent allocations
is denoted by A.
Given x ∈ AS, the interim utility of agent i ∈ S of type ti is:
Ui(x|ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
q(t−i | ti)ui(xi(t−i, ti), (t−i, ti)).
If agent i of type ti pretends to be of type t′i (while all other agents are
truthful), she gets interim utility:
Ui(x, t′i | ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
q(t−i | ti)ui(xi(t−i, t′i), (t−i, ti)).
An S-allocation x ∈ AS is incentive compatible if for every i ∈ S and for
every ti, t′i ∈ Ti:
Ui(x | ti) ≥ Ui(x, t′i | ti).
We shall denote the set of incentive compatible S-allocations by A∗S, and the
set of incentive compatible allocations by A∗.
For an event E ⊆ T and ti ∈ Ti, let
E−i(ti) = {t−i ∈ T−i | (ti, t−i) ∈ E}
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and
Ei = {ti ∈ Ti | E−i(ti) 6= ∅}.
Consider an allocation rule x ∈ A, agent i of type ti and an event E. Suppose
q(E−i(ti)) > 0. Then the interim utility conditional on E can be expressed
as:
Ui(x|ti, E) =
∑
t−i∈E−i(ti)
q(t−i | ti)ui(xi(t−i, ti), (t−i, ti)).
(Strictly speaking, the expression on the right hand side should be divided
by q(E−i(ti)|ti), but we will find it convenient not to do so.)
The corresponding interim utility (conditional on E) if type ti pretends
to be of type t′i is:
Ui(x, t′i | ti, E) =
∑
t−i∈E−i(ti)
q(t−i | ti)ui(xi(t−i, t′i), (t−i, ti)).
Given E ⊆ T , an S-allocation x ∈ AS is incentive compatible over E if for
every i ∈ S and for every ti, t′i ∈ Ei:
Ui(x | ti, E) ≥ Ui(x, t′i | ti, E).
The set of such allocations is denoted A∗S(E).
In the next section we will begin by considering events that refer to inde-
pendent subsets of Ti, and are therefore product events of the form E =
∏
iEi,
where Ei ⊆ Ti for all i. In later sections this restriction will be relaxed.
3 Coalitional Voting
One way to assess the coalitional stability of a status-quo is to ask whether
or not some coalition would vote unanimously in favor of another feasible
“outcome.” This is a somewhat pedantic exercise in the complete information
framework because there it is obvious that the core is precisely the set of
allocations which no coalition would vote (unanimously) to give up in favor
of some other feasible allocation. Moreover, this conclusion does not depend
on precisely how the coalitional voting game is constructed. Our aim is to
take this simple characterization of core stability in the complete information
case and extend it to a model with incomplete information.3 Since several
3The test being performed here is weaker than the implementation exercise. In the
classical framework it is possible to construct a game form that implements the core of
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new issues arise in this transition, it is useful to begin by illustrating the
coalitional voting approach in the simple setting where types are verifiable.
The main focus of the paper, however, is the more general case in which
types are not verifiable.
3.1 Verifiable Types
We take verifiability of types to mean that eventually all private information
becomes public, and contracts contingent on types can be enforced (by using
prohibitive penalties if necessary). In this setting agents cannot misrepresent
their types, and incentive constraints become unnecessary. Despite this sim-
plicity, it is by no means obvious how the core should be defined in such a
model. Indeed, Wilson [17] suggested two distinct notions of the core: the fine
core (allowing arbitrary information sharing) and the coarse core (allowing
agents to coordinate only on common knowledge events); see Forges, Minelli
and Vohra [6] for precise definitions based on the types formulation. Wil-
son’s notion of the core, and others that have since been suggested, all follow
the traditional approach based on dominance and feasibility of a potential
objection. The main conceptual issue in the construction of an objection con-
cerns an exogenously specified information transmission within the coalition
(see also Lee and Volij [8] and Volij [16]).4 The coalitional voting approach
is different in that it seeks to justify the notion of an objection from more
primitive principles: an equilibrium in a voting game is used as a means for
defining what an “objection” is. As we shall see, in the verifiable types case,
this approach leads to just one corresponding notion of the core - Wilson’s
fine core. We see this as an illustration of the power of the coalitional voting
approach in selecting an appropriate notion of core stability.
Suppose x ∈ A is the status-quo and coalition S can consider making use
of a voting game to discard x in favor of y ∈ AS. More precisely, members
of S vote to either “accept” or “reject” the new proposal y. It is important
an economy; see, for example, Perry and Reny [12], and Serrano and Vohra [14]. The
present paper may be seen as a preliminary step in developing game forms to implement
the “core” in incomplete information economies.
4An alternative route is taken by de Clippel [2], who proposes a competitive screening
procedure with outside brokers that absorb bankruptcies in objections. This allows him to
transform each agent’s decision problem of whether joining an objection into a one-person
decision problem, independent of more complex considerations, such as the ones tackled
here in terms of information transmission.
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that y is not seen as a proposal by a particular agent, in order to avoid
complications of signaling that such an act would imply.5 The coalition is
simply asked to make a choice between x and y. In case of a unanimous
“accept” vote, the outcome assigned will be y(t) to coalition S, where t is
the profile of actual types. Note that type announcements are not necessary
because we are assuming that the types eventually become publicly known.6
In case of a “reject” vote from any member of S the mediator assigns x(t) to
the grand coalition. This defines a game Γ0x(S, y), in which the only active
players are all the players in S, who simultaneously must choose from {a, r},
(“accept” or “reject” the alternative y). Then, y is implemented if and only
if it is unanimously accepted; otherwise, x is the outcome. A strategy for
player i is a function vi : Ti 7→ {a, r}. Given a profile of strategies (vi(·)),
the outcome φ(v) for members of S is defined as follows:
φi(v(t)) =
{
yi(t) if vi(ti) = a for all i ∈ S
xi(t) otherwise
A strategy profile v¯ of the voting game Γ0x(S, y) is a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium if, for all i ∈ S and ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(φi(v¯|ti)) ≥ Ui(φi(v¯−i, vi)|ti), for all vi : Ti 7→ {a, r}.
Given a Bayesian Nash equilibrium v¯, define for each i the set of types
who vote to accept the alternative, i.e.,
Ei(v¯) = {ti ∈ Ti|vi(ti) = a}.
For i ∈ S, let E−i =
∏
j∈S,j 6=iEj × T−S.
In a voting game Γ0x(S, y), a Bayesian Nash equilibrium v¯ is said to be an
equilibrium rejection of x if there is positive probability that in equilibrium
all agents vote to accept the alternative mechanism, i.e., q(∏i∈S Ei(v¯)) > 0,
and φ(v¯) is not interim equivalent to x for all i ∈ S (in the sense that there
exists i ∈ S and ti ∈ Ti such that Ui(φi(v¯) | ti) > Ui(x | ti))).
5An extension to coalitional settings of the type of analysis in Maskin and Tirole [9]
would be an important next step. In their approach, the informed principal proposes the
agent a contract that, therefore, may signal some of his private information.
6A model in which agents have to announce their types in order to implement the allo-
cation, but types become known at a later stage (and prohibitive penalties are available),
is operationally identical to this because it can be assumed that agents announce their
types truthfully.
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A status-quo x is resilient to coalitional voting with verifiable types if there
does not exist a voting game Γ0x(S, y) with an equilibrium rejection of x.
Proposition 1 Given x ∈ A, a coalition S and y ∈ AS, the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(a) There is an equilibrium rejection of x in the voting game Γ0x(S, y).
(b) There exists y′ ∈ AS and Ei ⊆ Ti for all i ∈ S, where q(E) > 0 for the
product event E = ∏i∈S Ei × T−S, such that:
Ui(y′ | ti, E) ≥ Ui(x | ti, E) for all i ∈ S and all ti ∈ Ei,
with strict inequality for some i and ti.
Corollary 1 x is resilient to coalitional voting with verifiable types if and
only if it belongs to the fine core.
The corollary follows from the fact that condition (b) is essentially the
same as the definition of a fine objection; see, for example, Forges, Minelli
and Vohra [6]. The only difference is that an “objection” is usually defined
with a strict inequality for all i. It should be clear that the characterization
of equilibria of voting games will be in the form of weak inequalities. For
this reason, throughout this paper, when we refer to a certain core concept
it should be understood to be the “strong” version of that core concept.7
It is also worth remarking that statement (a) in the Proposition simply
refers to an equilibrium of the voting game, and unlike statement (b) or
the definition of a fine objection, it is not couched in terms of a particular
event over which an “objection” takes place. This is a feature of our other
equivalence results below as well.
Proof of Proposition 1: An equilibrium σ¯ of the voting game Γ0x(S, y) can
be characterized equivalently in terms of y and x as follows. For all i ∈ S
and ti ∈ Ei = Ei(σ¯):
∑
t−i∈E−i
q(t−i|ti)ui(y, (ti, t−i))+
∑
t−i /∈E−i
q(t−i|ti)ui(x, (ti, t−i)) ≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
q(t−i|ti)ui(x, (ti, t−i)),
7Monotonicity of preferences will suffice to eliminate this difference as well, in the
present result. However, when we turn to the case of non-verifiable types, this difference
may be important.
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and for all i ∈ S, ti /∈ Ei:
∑
t−i∈E−i
q(t−i|ti)ui(y, (ti, t−i))+
∑
t−i /∈E−i
q(t−i|ti)ui(x, (ti, t−i)) ≤
∑
t−i∈T−i
q(t−i|ti)ui(x, (ti, t−i)).
These two conditions are equivalent to the following two conditions:
Ui(y | ti, E) ≥ Ui(x | ti, E) for all i ∈ S and ti ∈ Ei (1)
and
Ui(y | ti, E) ≤ Ui(x | ti, E) for all i ∈ S and ti /∈ Ei. (2)
Clearly, this means that (a) implies (b).
To see that (b) implies (a) consider y′ and E satisfying condition (b), and
define:
y(t) =
{
y′(t) if t ∈ E
0 otherwise.
Since Ui(y′ | ti, E) = Ui(y | ti, E) for all i ∈ S and ti ∈ Ei, it follows that y
satisfies both (1) and (2), and this completes the proof.
3.2 Non-Verifiable Types
When types are not verifiable, we need to be more careful about precisely
what a status-quo means. Henceforth, we shall take a status-quo x to refer
to an incentive compatible, state contingent allocation (thus x ∈ A∗) with
the interpretation that in every state t, the outcome is x(t), unless there is
an agreement to change it. This means, in particular, that if there is an
attempt to change the status-quo but the attempt fails, the outcome in state
t is x(t), i.e., any discussion about a possible change does not by itself allow
any agent to strategically manipulate the status-quo x.8 Since x was assumed
to be incentive compatible, this can be justified by a scenario in which agents
have already sent their truthful reports to implement the status-quo via a
direct mechanism. And this cannot be changed if the status-quo prevails.
This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis, and will be used throughout
the rest of this paper.
8Cramton and Palfrey [1] consider the opposite case: if an alternative is accepted no
manipulation is possible but a rejection yields information that can be used in manipulat-
ing the “status-quo.”)
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As before, coalitional voting may involve a comparison between a status-
quo (a feasible allocation rule for the grand coalition) and an allocation rule
that is feasible (both informationally and physically) for the given coalition.
However, when types are not verifiable, an allocation rule is only the simplest
example of what a coalition may consider as an alternative. More generally,
we may think of a coalition constructing a communication mechanism of its
own to map out its feasible set of alternatives. Indeed, this will capture
the idea that a coalition is permitted as much latitude in constructing a
competing proposal as is within the bounds of feasibility. A voting game can
now be used to describe the situation in which members of a coalition vote to
reject a status-quo in favor of a competing mechanism. The new mechanism
is applied if all agents vote for it; otherwise the status-quo remains as the
outcome. We will say that a status-quo is resilient to coalitional voting if
there does not exist a coalition and a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a voting
game in which an alternative mechanism is unanimously accepted in some
positive probability state. Note that our approach yields a very strong notion
of stability; a resilient allocation rule cannot be rejected in any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of any competing mechanism in any (positive probability) state.
We now turn to formal definitions.
A mechanism for coalition S consists of message sets Mi for each i ∈ S
and an outcome function g : M 7→ AS.
A status-quo x ∈ A∗, and a mechanism for S, ((Mi)i∈S, g), define a
voting game in which each player i ∈ S chooses an action in {a, r} ×Mi.
The interpretation being that a refers to an “accept” vote in favor of the new
mechanism while r refers to a rejection of the new proposal. A strategy for
player i is therefore σi : Ti 7→ {a, r}×Mi. We will find it convenient to denote
σi(ti) = (vi(ti), mi(ti)), where the first element denotes the vote of agent i
of type ti. Given a strategy profile σ, let φ(σ) denote the corresponding
outcome for coalition S. In state t, the commodity bundle assigned to each
i ∈ S is denoted φi(σ(t)), and defined as follows:9
φi(σ(t)) =
{
gi(m(t)) for all t such that vi(ti) = a for all i ∈ S
xi(t) otherwise
A coalitional voting game for coalition S corresponding to a status-quo x
and a mechanism ((Mi), g) can now be denoted Γx(S, (Mi)i∈S, g). This is the
9Note that φ(σ(t)) does not necessarily belong to AS since (xi(t))i∈S need not belong
to AS .
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formulation first used by Holmstro¨m and Myerson [7], for the grand coalition,
in defining their notion of durability. And as they pointed out, this way of
formulating a voting game is more general than it may first seem. It includes
any complex voting procedure for various alternatives, as long as each agent
has the option, at the outset, to anonymously veto the new proposal and
revert to the status-quo. The mechanism can then be interpreted as the
normal form of the game following the accept/reject vote.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the voting game Γx is a strategy profile
σ, for members of S such that, for all i ∈ S and ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(φi(σ)|ti) ≥ Ui(φi(σ−i, σ′i)|ti), for all σ′i : Ti 7→ {a, r} ×Mi.
In a direct mechanism ((Ti), y), a truthful equilibrium is an equilibrium
where mi(ti) = ti for all i ∈ S and all ti ∈ Ti.
Given a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ = ((vi(ti), mi(ti))i∈S, define for each
i ∈ S the set of types who vote a, i.e.,
Ei(σ) = {ti ∈ Ti|vi(ti) = a}.
Let E(σ) = ∏i∈S Ei(σ) × T−S denote the states in which the alternative is
adopted.
In a voting game Γx(S, (Mi)i∈S, g), a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ is said
to be an equilibrium rejection of x if there is positive probability that in equi-
librium all agents vote to accept the alternative mechanism, i.e., q(E(σ)) > 0,
and φ(σ) is not interim equivalent to x for all i ∈ S.
A status-quo x is resilient to coalitional voting if there does not exist a
voting game Γx(S, (Mi)i∈S, g), with an equilibrium rejection of x.
Proposition 2 Given x ∈ A∗ and a coalition S, the following statements
are equivalent:
(a) There is an equilibrium rejection of x in voting game Γx(S, (Mi)i∈S, g).
(b) There is a truthful equilibrium rejection of x in a (direct) voting game
Γx(S, (Ti)i∈S, y).
(c) There exists y′ ∈ AS and Ei ⊆ Ti for all i ∈ S, where q(E) > 0 for the
product event E = ∏i∈S Ei × T−S, such that:
(i) Ui(y′ | ti, E) ≥ Ui(x | ti, E) for all i ∈ S and all ti ∈ Ei, with
strict inequality for some i and ti.
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(ii) Ui(y′ | ti, E) ≤ Ui(x | ti, E) for all i ∈ S and all ti /∈ Ei.
(iii) y′ ∈ A∗S(E).
It is instructive to compare this proposition to the revelation principle.
The equivalence between (a) and (b) follows from the usual argument, and
allows us to restrict attention to direct mechanisms, without loss of generality.
It shows that a wide variety of coalitional voting games are strategically
equivalent to one in which agents vote and report their types. In terms
of Bayesian Nash equilibria, it is unimportant whether the vote and type
reports are simultaneous or sequential (votes followed by type reports or vice
versa). In equilibrium, acceptance of an alternative mechanism is equivalent
to truthful acceptance in a direct voting game.
The equivalence of these with (c) has a more novel interpretation: it can
be viewed as a form of a revelation principle concerning mechanisms in the
context of a status-quo. The existence of an equilibrium rejection (through
some mechanism) of a status-quo is equivalent to the existence of a feasible
allocation rule satisfying the three inequalities in condition (c): (i) there is a
product event over which all members of the coalition gain, (ii) it is reasonable
for them to believe this event since those types who do not belong to this
event would not vote to accept the alternative mechanism, and (iii) the new
proposed mechanism is incentive compatible over the event E.
Dutta and Vohra [4] define x ∈ A∗ to be in the credible core if there does
not exist a coalition S, y′ ∈ AS and an event E =
∏
i∈S Ei × T−S (where
q(E) > 0 and Ei ⊆ Ti for all i ∈ S) such that
(i) Ui(y
′|ti,E)
q(E−i(ti)|ti) >
Ui(xi|ti,E)
q(E−i(ti)|ti) for all i ∈ S and all ti ∈ Ei.
(ii) Ui(y
′|ti,E)
q(E−i(ti)|ti) ≤
Ui(xi|ti,E)
q(E−i(ti)|ti) for all i ∈ S and ti /∈ Ei such that E−i(ti) 6= ∅.
(iii) y′ ∈ A∗S(E).
Note that if agent i is of type ti /∈ Ei and E−i(ti) = ∅, then her vote has no
bearing on the outcome. Thus condition (ii) above is the same as condition
c (ii) of Proposition 2. This observation yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2 x is resilient to coalitional voting if and only if it belongs to
the credible core.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose σ = (vi(ti), mi(ti)) is an equilibrium of
Γx(S, (Mi)i∈S, g). Let Ei = {ti ∈ Ti | vi(ti) = a}, and let y(t) = g(m(t)) for
all t. The equilibrium interim utility of agent i of type ti is:
Ui(σ | ti) =
{
Ui(y | ti, E) + Ui(x | ti, T \ E) if ti ∈ Ei
Ui(x | ti) otherwise.
The fact that σ is an equilibrium means:
(1) An agent i ∈ S of type ti ∈ Ei cannot gain by rejecting the alternative,
Ui(y | ti, E) ≥ Ui(x | ti, E) for all i ∈ S and all ti ∈ Ei, (1)
or by continuing to accept but changing the choice of mi(ti) to mi(t′i),
Ui(y | ti, E) ≥ Ui(y, t′i | ti, E) for all i ∈ S, ti ∈ Ei, t′i ∈ Ti. (2)
(2) An agent i of type ti /∈ Ei cannot gain by accepting the alternative, and
choosing mi(t′i),
Ui(x | ti, E) ≥ Ui(y, t′i | ti, E) for all i ∈ S, ti /∈ Ei, t′i ∈ Ti. (3)
Since agent i of type ti /∈ Ei cannot change the outcome by continuing to
reject the alternative, this exhausts all possible unilateral deviations. Thus
conditions (1), (2) and (3) characterize an equilibrium of the voting mech-
anism. If the equilibrium involves a rejection of the status-quo, then in
addition to these three conditions we must have q(E) > 0 and at least one
inequality in (1) being strict. Clearly, then (a) implies (b) as well as (c). Of
course, (b) implies (a), and so it remains only to show that (c) implies (b).
To see that (c) implies (b), consider y′ and E satisfying condition (c).
Let
y(t) =
{
y′(t) if t ∈ E
0 otherwise.
Since Ui(y′ | ti, E) = Ui(y | ti, E) for all i ∈ S and ti ∈ Ei, it follows from (i)
of condition (c) that y satisfies (1), with at least one strict inequality. From
(ii) of condition (c) we know that y′ (or y) satisfies (3) for all t′i ∈ Ei. The
fact that y also satisfies it for all t′i /∈ Ei follows from construction. Similarly,
(2) follows from (iii) of condition (c).
We proceed to give an example that illustrates the difference between the
credible core and the incentive compatible fine core. It is a simple version of
a “lemon” asymmetric information economy, and it is taken from Vohra [15].
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Example 1: Let N = {1, 2}. Agent 1 is fully informed and has two
possible types: T1 = {tH , tL}. Agent 2 is uninformed about the true type of
agent 1 and assigns equal probability to both. Let tH also denote the high
state and tL the low state. Agent 1 is the seller of an indivisible good to be
traded for money, and agent 2 is the buyer. In state tH , agents’ valuations for
the indivisible good are v1 and v2, respectively, while they are 0 in state tL.
We shall assume that v2/2 < v1 < v2. Under these assumptions, the credible
core consists exclusively of no-trade contracts in state tH and no transfers
of money in state tL. To see this, suppose there were trade in state tH .
Individual rationality for the seller implies that the money transfer should
be at least v1. Using incentive compatibility, one can establish that the same
transfer must happen in state tL, which makes it impossible for the buyer
to meet his individual rationality constraint. Note how any fine objection
(constructed in state tH) would not be credible because type tL would like
to join. However, as just observed, any credible core contract would not be
in the incentive compatible fine core.
4 Mediated Voting/Blocking
The purpose of the next two sections is to connect our approach, in which
information transmission occurs endogenously in equilibria of voting games,
with a core concept recently proposed in Myerson [11]. Myerson derives
his concept from very different considerations rooted in the idea of virtual
utility. It is instructive to obtain Myerson’s virtual utility core from our
approach by adding two layers of generality to our voting games. First, in
this section we continue to consider deterministic coalition formation –in each
of the coalitional voting games considered, the players of a fixed coalition S
are the only active players– but the type reports are used by the blocking
mediator to construct objections over events that do not necessarily have a
product structure. The next section will add to this the possibility of random
coalitions.
There is one respect in which the voting mechanism of the previous section
is not general enough. While agents are allowed a lot of flexibility in choosing
a communication mechanism, the fact that the application of the alternative
mechanism is based on independent accept/reject decisions may turn out to
be an important restriction. One can argue that if a mediator can be used
to translate messages into actions, presumably the mediator could also be
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delegated the accept/reject decision itself (perhaps as a function of additional
inputs into the mechanism).
Recall that in the voting game Γx(S, (Mi)i∈S, g) of the previous section,
the outcome function of the mechanism (M, g) maps from M to AS. How-
ever, an outcome of the game includes the possibility that the alternative is
rejected, and the status-quo survives. A more general communication mech-
anism would allow the outcome function to map fromM to AS∪{x}.10 This
is the interpretation of a mechanism we shall adopt in this section. As before,
an agent votes for or against a new mechanism and also chooses a message
to communicate in the mechanism. Given a status-quo x, coalition S and
a mechanism (M, g), where g : 7→ AS ∪ {x}, we now denote the coalitional
voting game by Γ′x(S, (Mi)i∈S, g).
Given a strategy profile σ, let φ(σ) denote the corresponding outcome for
coalition S. Let E(σ) denote the states in which the mechanism effectively
adopts a new alternative, i.e.,
E(σ) = {t ∈ T | φ(σ(t)) 6= x(t)}.
Note that t ∈ E(σ) implies that vi(ti) = a for all i ∈ S, but the converse
may not hold, i.e., acceptance of an “alternative” by all agents in S does not
necessarily mean that the mechanism accepts it. Indeed, there may be states
in which, despite all types involved accept the alternative, the status-quo is
implemented by the mechanism: it is as if over such states the given potential
blocking plan is “turned off.”
Given an event E, let
Ei = {ti ∈ Ti | (ti, t−i) ∈ E for some t−i ∈ T−i}.
Note that now an event E need not be a product event.
In a voting game Γ′x(S, (Mi)i∈S, g), a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ is said
to be an equilibrium rejection of x if q(E(σ)) > 0 and φ(σ) is not interim
equivalent to x for all i ∈ S.
A status-quo x is resilient to mediated coalitional voting if there does not
exist a voting game Γ′x(S, (Mi)i∈S, g) with an equilibrium rejection of x.
Proposition 3 Given x ∈ A∗ and a coalition S, the following statements
are equivalent:
10There is some abuse of notation here because rejecting the new mechanism leads to
x(t) in state t.
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(a) There is an equilibrium rejection of x in a mediated voting game Γ′x(S, (Mi)i∈S, g).
(b) There is a truthful equilibrium rejection of x in a (direct) mediated
voting game Γ′x(S, (Ti)i∈S, y).
(c) There exists y′ ∈ AS and E ⊆ T (with q(E) > 0) such that:
(i) Ui(y′ | ti, E) ≥ Ui(x | ti, E) for all i ∈ S and all ti ∈ Ei, with
strict inequality for some i and ti.
(ii)
∑
t−i∈E−i(ti) q(t)[ui(yi(t), t)− ui(xi(t), t)] ≥∑
t−i∈E−i(t′i) q(t)[ui(yi(t−i, t
′
i), t)−ui(xi(t), t)] for all i ∈ S, ti, t′i ∈ Ti.
Again, we can use the equivalence between (a) and (b) to claim that
multiple versions of the coalitional voting game are strategically equivalent.
One version that we will find convenient in terms of fixing ideas is the fol-
lowing. Using the words of Myerson [11], suppose that the “blocking plan”
constructed by the “blocking mediator” for coalition S involves departing
from the status-quo only over an event ES × T−S for some ES ⊆ TS. Effec-
tively, ES is the set of type profiles for S over which the blocking mediator
“turns on” the objection to abandon the status-quo, while elsewhere the ob-
jection is “turned off.” In the game, each agent i ∈ S reports his type ti ∈ Ti
and takes an action mi ∈ Mi. Then, the mediator implements an outcome
different from x if and only if the reported types belong to ES. Of course,
for us an ES supporting an objection will be found endogenously, associated
with an equilibrium of the voting game.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose σ = (vi(ti), mi(ti)) constitutes an equi-
librium rejection of x in the voting game Γ′x(S, (Mi)i∈S, g). Let E(σ) be
the positive probability event over which the outcome of σ is not x, and let
y(t) = φ(m(t)) for all t. Of course, vi(ti) = {a} for all ti ∈ Ei(σ). Moreover,
without loss of generality, one can modify, if necessary, the outcome function
of the mechanism, so that following a change from σ to σ′ consisting only
in having all types vote a, the outcome is still different from x on E(σ). It
is easy to see that σ′ is an equilibrium rejection of x in the modified game.
It now follows that in the direct mediated mechanism Γ′x(S, (Ti)i∈S, y), it
is an equilibrium for all types of agents in S to accept, and report truth-
fully. To see this, note that voting to reject the alternative mechanism yields
the status-quo - an option that was feasible in the original mechanism. A
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unilateral deception also yields an outcome that is feasible in the original
mechanism. Clearly then, (a) and (b) are equivalent.
Suppose σ is a truthful equilibrium rejection of x in the game Γ′x(S, (Ti)i∈S, y).
This means that:
• No i ∈ S of type ti can gain by rejecting the alternative mechanism.
For any ti /∈ Ei(σ) the accept/reject decision is outcome equivalent.
For ti ∈ Ei(σ), we must have Ui(y | ti, E) ≥ Ui(x | ti, E). Thus,
Ui(y | ti, E) ≥ Ui(x | ti, E) for all i ∈ S and all ti ∈ Ei,
with strict inequality for some i of some type.
• No i ∈ S of type ti can gain by pretending to be of type t′i (incentive
compatibility). The interim utility from truthful reporting is:
Ui(σ | ti) =
∑
t−i∈E−i(ti)
q(t)ui(yi(t), t) +
∑
t−i /∈E−i(ti)
q(t)ui(xi(t), t).
If agent i of type ti reports t′i, the resulting interim utility is:11
Ui(σ, t′i | ti) =
∑
t−i∈E−i(t′i)
q(t)ui(yi(t−i, t′i), t) +
∑
t−i /∈E−i(t′i)
q(t)ui(xi(t), t).
And we must have
Ui(σ | ti) ≥ Ui(σ, t′i | ti) for all i ∈ S, for all ti, t′i ∈ Ti.
This general incentive compatibility constraint can also be expressed
in a form that compares utilities only over the relevant subset of E(σ).
To do this, subtract Ui(x | ti) from the right hand side of both Ui(σ | ti)
and Ui(σ, t′i | ti) to re-state the above inequality as:
∑
t−i∈E−i(ti) q(t)[ui(yi(t), t)− ui(xi(t), t)] ≥∑
t−i∈E−i(t′i) q(t)[ui(yi(t−i, t
′
i), t)− ui(xi(t), t)] for all i ∈ S, ti, t′i ∈ Ti.
(IC)
11Note how the different type report affects the implementation of the blocking plan,
but not that of the status-quo.
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This proves that (b) implies (c). The converse follows easily from the same
arguments as above by considering the direct mediated mechanism y′where:
y′(t) =
{
y(t) if t ∈ E
x(t) otherwise
To compare Proposition 3 to Proposition 2, consider x ∈ A∗ and y, E
satisfying condition (c) of Proposition 3. For t′i /∈ Ei, E−i(t′i) = ∅ (or more
precisely, consists of types that have 0 probability given ti). The RHS of
(c.ii) is then 0, and the condition becomes the same as (c.i). Thus, we need
only to consider (c.ii) for those cases in which t′i ∈ Ei.
It may now be useful to write (c.ii) explicitly for the remaining two cases:
(i) ti /∈ Ei and t′i ∈ Ei: in this case, the LHS is 0, and (c.ii) becomes the
same as (c.ii) of Proposition 2; the self selection condition used in defining a
credible objection.
(ii) ti ∈ Ei and t′i ∈ Ei: in this case, if E has a product structure,
E−i(ti) = E−i(t′i) and it is easy to see that (c.ii) of Proposition 3 is the same
as (c.iii) of Proposition 2.
Thus, we see that part (c) of Proposition 2 implies (c) of Proposition 3,
and the converse holds if E is a product event. This leads us to define the
mediated core as the set of all allocations in A∗ for which there does not exist
a coalition S, and event E and an allocation y ∈ AS satisfying condition
(c) of Proposition 3. Clearly then, the mediated core is a subset of the
credible core. Recall the analogy from the introduction: a credible objection
is to the independent choice of actions in a Nash equilibrium just like a
mediated objection is to the action choice in a correlated equilibrium. The
next example illustrates the difference between credible core and mediated
core, and shows that the mediated core can be a strict subset of the credible
core.
Example 2: Consider an exchange economy with three agents and three
commodities. Agent 3 is uninformed and agents 1 and 2 have two types each:
T1 = {t1, t′1}, T2 = {t2, t′2} and each state is equally likely. Let t = (t1, t2)
and t′ = (t′1, t′2). The state independent endowments are:
ω1 = (1, 0, 0), ω2 = (0, 1, 0), ω3 = (0, 0, 2).
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The utility functions are:
u1((z1, z2, z3), t) = 0.9z1 + z2 + 1.05z3
u1((z1, z2, z3), t′) = 5z3
u1((z1, z2, z3), (t′1, t2)) = u1((z1, z2, z3), (t1, t′2)) = 0.9z1 + z2
u2((z1, z2, z3), t) = z1 + 0.9z2 + 1.05z3
u2((z1, z2, z3), t′) = 5z3
u2((z1, z2, z3), (t′1, t2)) = u2((z1, z2, z3), (t1, t′2)) = z1 + 0.9z2
u3((z1, z2, z3), s) = z1 + z2 for all s.
The status-quo allocation x, along with ex-post utilities, is the following:
t2 t′2
t1
x1 = (0, 0, 1); u1 = 1.05
x2 = (0, 0, 1); u2 = 1.05
x3 = (1, 1, 0); u3 = 2
x1 = (0, 0.8, 0); u1 = 0.8
x2 = (1, 0.1, 0); u2 = 1.09
x3 = (0, 0.1, 2); u3 = 0.1
t′1
x1 = (0.1, 1, 0); u1 = 1.09
x2 = (0.8, 0, 0); u2 = 0.8
x3 = (0.1, 0, 2); u3 = 0.1
x1 = (0, 0, 1); u1 = 5
x2 = (0, 0, 1); u2 = 5
x3 = (1, 1, 0); u3 = 2
This allocation rule is incentive compatible, individually rational and in-
terim efficient. Furthermore, coalition {1, 2} does not have a coarse objection
because type t′1 and t′2 cannot be better off without commodity z3. Also, it
is easy to see that coalitions {1, 3} or {2, 3} do not have a coarse objection:
there are not enough units of the first two goods to improve upon player 3’s
expected utility. This shows that x is in the incentive compatible coarse core.
Moreover, there is no credible objection to x either. To see this suppose
there is a credible objection by agents 1 and 2 over some event E. If the event
is t or t′ they cannot do better. If the event is (t′1, t2) they can do better, but
then type t1 will want to lie; the preferences of agent 1 are the same in (t1, t2)
and (t′1, t2). The event E cannot be the first column either, because agent 1
will have to be given utility at least 1.09 in each state (to make sure that she
is better-off in state (t′1, t2), and to maintain incentive compatibility). But
then t2 would be worse off, getting no more than a utility of 0.9 in each state.
For similar reasons, the argument holds for state (t1, t′2), or for the first row.
This exhausts all possibilities for a credible objection. Thus x belongs to the
credible core.
Now consider a mediated objection in which the mediator will use the
mechanism δ described below for coalition {1, 2} in states other than t′. (We
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know that there does not exist a credible objection over the event T , so it
is not important what the allocation rule for the coalition specifies in state
t′). As we shall see, the event over which the objection is “turned on” is
E{1,2} = T \ {t′}, while in state t′ the objection is “turned off” and the
status-quo is to be implemented, despite the fact that types t′1 and t′2 would
be voting to accept the plan δ in the corresponding equilibrium rejection of
x. Here is the mediated objection:
t2 t′2
t1
y1 = (0, 1, 0); u1 = 1
y2 = (1, 0, 0); u2 = 1
y1 = (0, 0.895, 0); u1 = 0.895
y2 = (1, 0.105, 0); u2 = 1.0945
t′1
y1 = (0.105, 1, 0); u1 = 1.0945
y2 = (0.895, 0, 0); u2 = 0.895
One can show that there exists an equilibrium rejection of x in the voting
game Γ′x({1, 2}, (Ti)i∈{1,2}, y) where the event E over which there is a depar-
ture from the status-quo is T \{t′}. That is, we claim that σ is an equilibrium
rejection of x, where each type of agents 1 and 2 accepts the alternative to
the status-quo, reports his type truthfully, and E(σ) = T \ {t′}. We proceed
to the analysis of such an equilibrium rejection of x.
Type t1 prefers to accept the alternative, given that the two types of
agent 2 are also accepting it. His expected utility from the blocking plan is
higher than at the status-quo: he gets a utility equal to 1 in state (t1, t2)
and equal to 0.895 in state (t1, t′2) (instead of status-quo utilities 1.05 and
0.8, respectively). In the words of Myerson [11], this type of agent 1 receives
the call of the blocking mediator with probability 1 in this blocking plan.
Thus, he maintains the same beliefs to sustain a higher expected utility in
the blocking plan.
On the other hand, type t′1, who also wants to accept the alternative,
compares the different bundles offered by the blocking plan and the status-
quo only in state (t′1, t2) (because t′ /∈ E(σ)). In that state the blocking plan
utility is 1.0945, higher than the status-quo utility of 1.09. The arguments
for types t2 and t′2 are identical to those for t1 and t′1, respectively.
It only remains to check that each type does not have an incentive to
change his type report in the voting game. This amounts to showing incentive
compatibility over the event E(σ) of the blocking plan.
Let us begin with type t1. Again, by being truthful in equilibrium, his
expected utility will be (1/2)(1 + 0.895). If he misreports his type by an-
nouncing t′1 to the mediator, he will be invited to the blocking plan only
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with probability 1/2, when the type of player 2 is t2, and he will then be
offered to consume (0.105, 1, 0), whereas with the rest of probability he will
not be invited to the blocking plan and the status-quo will result. However,
in this case, his false report will not interfere with the status-quo since, to
implement it, the very first (truthful) reports are used. In conclusion, in
this case he is allocated (0, 0.8, 0). The corresponding expected utility is
(1/2)(1.0945 + 0.8), smaller than what he gets by being truthful in equilib-
rium. In other words, type t1 does not gain by lying, because the gain in the
first column is 0.0945, but the loss in the second column is 0.095.
Finally, let us check the incentives of type t′1. If he reports truthfully,
with probability 1/2 he will be invited to the objection and be allocated
(0.105, 1, 0) [in state (t′1, t2)], while with probability 1/2 he will be allocated
(0, 0, 1) [in state (t′1, t′2) from the status-quo, where he really values good z3].
This is better than being allocated (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0.895, 0), respectively. Of
course, the incentive compatibility arguments for types t2 and t′2 are identical
to the corresponding types of player 1, and we omit them.
Deviations from σ consisting of an untruthful type report and rejection
of the alternative have already been taken care of, since in this case the
untruthful report is not taken into account, for the implementation of the
status-quo. Hence, we have established that σ is an equilibrium rejection of
x that sustains δ as a mediated objection over the event E(σ) = T \ {t′}.
Since the blocking inequalities we have written are all strict, we can con-
clude that x is not in the (weak) mediated core, and therefore not in the
mediated core either.
5 Randomized Mediation
In this section we generalize the voting game of the previous section by
considering a mechanism that involves an even more sophisticated role for the
mediator. A mediator may construct a blocking plan in which the coalition
that is asked to vote on a new alternative mechanism is chosen at random.
This corresponds closely to the core concept in Myerson [11].12
Now, a proposal by a mediator, µ, consists of a probability distribu-
tion of feasible allocation mechanisms for various coalitions. In particular,
12To maintain comparability with the previous sections we neglect the possibility that
the alternative mechanism may be a random state contingent allocation. Myerson [11]
allows for this form of randomization as well.
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µ(S, yS, t), where yS ∈ AS, denotes the probability with which coalition S is
invited by the mediator to vote for y against the status-quo, when the (re-
ported) state is t. Recall that, for ease of comparison with the previous sec-
tions we will consider randomization only over coalitions, i.e., µ(S, yS, t) > 0
implies µ(S, zS, t) = 0 for all zS 6= yS. Thus, we associate with each coali-
tion S one proposed allocation yS ∈ AS. The mediator may choose with
positive probability not to invite any coalition, thereby imposing the status-
quo. Thus, for each t ∈ T , 0 ≤ µ(S, yS, t) ≤ 1 for all coalitions S, and∑
S µ(S, yS, t) ≤ 1. This describes a “blocking plan” used in the defini-
tion and characterization of the inner core; see Myerson [10], Qin [13] and
de Clippel and Minelli [3].
In the following paragraphs we describe a voting game, an extension of
the game Γ′x of the previous section. As before, at the outset, nature chooses
state t with probability q(t). Each player i ∈ N of type ti is endowed with
his interim beliefs q(t−i|ti). Also, an incentive compatible status-quo x is
given, and truthful type reports (to be used in the implementation of x if
the alternative is rejected) have already been sent prior to the voting game.
Given Propositions 2 and 3, it should be clear that without loss of generality
we may concentrate on direct voting games in which agents vote and report
their types.
In each game of the previous sections, the set of active players was a
fixed coalition S. Since now coalitions are chosen at random in each state,
one has to specify when each player is “active” in the voting game, which
will correspond to when he is invited by the blocking mediator. Suppose that
coalitions are called according to the plan µ. Then, each player i ∈ N has an
action set Ti × {a, r} only if there exists S ⊇ {i} such that µ(S, yS, t) > 0.
Otherwise, agent i is not an active player in the voting game (his action set
is empty). At the time an active agent i has to move, he knows only his type
and the fact that there is a realization of the blocking plan µ in which he is
invited. Since such realizations depend on the type reports, each player must
form beliefs about how likely each of these realizations is: in equilibrium, he
will expect that all types are being truthful, and hence he will use the true
µ to perform all his expected utility calculations. Thus, all active agents,
according to µ, vote whether to accept or reject µ and report their types to
the mediator, who is forming coalitions according to the plan µ. If all voters
accept, and given their type reports, say t, the mediator chooses coalition S
with probability µ(S, yS, t). If there is at least one rejection, the status-quo
survives. Note that at the time of taking the vote each agent must, given
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the strategies of the others, use µ and Bayes’ rule to update his beliefs at his
information set. This allows him to figure out what is the probability that
each S he is a member of is being invited, and therefore that he will receive
each yS.
Note that, (1) if µ(S ′, yS′, t) = 0 for all coalitions S ′ 6= S, and (2) if
µ(S, yS, t) = 1 for states t ∈ ES × T−S, while µ(S, yS, t) = 0 for t /∈ ES ×
T−S, for some ES ⊆ TS, the voting game just described reduces to a game
Γ′x(S, (Ti)i∈S, y) of the previous section, in which the set of states ES × T−S
is that event over which this non-random alternative is “turned on.”
Based on the interpretation of a blocking mediator given by this voting
game with random coalitions, we are led to modifying the notion of mediated
core of the previous section as follows.
An allocation x ∈ A∗ is said to belong to the randomized mediated core
if there does not exist a blocking plan µ such that
∑
t−i
q(t)
∑
S⊇{i}
µ(S, yS, t)[ui(ySi (t), t)− ui(xi(t), t)] ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti
and
∑
t−i q(t)
∑
S⊇{i} µ(S, yS, t)[ui(ySi (t), t)− ui(xi(t), t)] ≥∑
t−i q(t)
∑
S⊇{i} µ(S, yS, t−i, t′i)[ui(ySi (t−i, t′i), t)− ui(xi(t), t)] for all i ∈ N and ti, t′i ∈ Ti.
Suppose µ is a deterministic blocking plan that only uses coalition S
and an S-allocation y over an event E. It follows that µ satisfies the above
inequalities if and only if (S, y, E) satisfies condition (c) of Proposition 3.
Equilibrium rejections of x given a deterministic blocking plan in the voting
game of this section are precisely the equilibrium rejections of x in games Γ′x
defined in the previous section. Since in addition we can have equilibrium
rejections associated with random blocking plans, we have:
Observation: The randomized mediated core is a subset of the mediated
core, itself a subset of the credible core.
Therefore, as in the previous section, we can define resilience to random-
ized mediated voting by considering random alternative mechanisms µ and
get an alternative characterization of the randomized mediated core. To
avoid repetitions, we will omit the corresponding statements.
The concept of randomized mediated core of the present section is very
similar to the core concept defined by Myerson [11]. The only differences are
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that: (1) he also allows for random allocation rules within each coalition,
and (2) he assumes that transfers are possible and feasibility is weakened to
require expected feasibility of the transferable commodity. Clearly, in terms
of a definition of blocking, feature (1) may be significant, as the feasible set
for coalitions is the set of lotteries over allocations, while feature (2) is a
technical assumption on the environments that Myerson [11] uses to prove
existence.
We close the section by going over another example, to illustrate the
difference between the randomized mediated core and other cores previously
mentioned.
Example 3: This example is an adaptation of Myerson’s [11] Example 1
to our framework. The set of agents is N = {1, 2}, and agent 2 is uninformed.
Let T1 = {tH , tL} be the set of types of agent 1. Both types are equally likely.
Agent 1 is a seller of good z1, to be exchanged for money (good z2). The
state-independent endowment is
ω1 = (1, 0), ω2 = (0, 10).
The utility functions are as follows:
u1((z1, z2), tH) = 5z1 + z2,
u1((z1, z2), tL) = z1 + z2;
u2((z1, z2), tH) = 6z1 + z2 − 10,
u2((z1, z2), tL) = 2z1 + z2 − 10.
Consider the following allocation x:
x1(tH) = (0.75, 1.3), x2(tH) = (0.25, 8.7)x1(tL) = (0, 2.05), x2(tL) = (1, 7.95).
This allocation is interim incentive efficient and interim individually ra-
tional. Therefore, it is in the incentive compatible coarse core. Furthermore,
because agent 1 is fully informed, it is easy to see that any allocation in the
incentive compatible coarse core is also in the credible core. Since in this
economy all events over which objections can be constructed have a product
structure, there are no additional mediated objections. Hence, the mediated
core also coincides with the credible core. Therefore, x is in the mediated
core of the previous section.
Let us see now that x is not in the randomized mediated core. Consider
the following blocking plan µ: µ({1, 2}, y{1,2}, tH) = 0.25, µ({1}, y{1}, tH) =
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0.75, while µ(S, yS, tL) = 0 for all S, where
y{1,2}1 (tH) = (0, 5.2), y
{1,2}
2 (tH) = (1, 4.8)y
{1}
1 (tH) = (1, 0).
In words, the blocking plan µ only concerns state tH . In it, coalition
{1, 2} will be formed with probability 0.25 and exchange the entire unit of
good z1 for 5.2 units of money, while with probability 0.75 agent 1 will be
instructed to keep his initial endowment.
In the corresponding voting game associated with µ, both agents 1 and
2 are “active” players. The following profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
let each agent accept the blocking plan and report his type truthfully. Let
us check this:
• Agent 1 of type tL is being excluded from the blocking plan µ. There-
fore, the expected utility that he receives from playing his equilibrium
strategy is the status-quo utility 2.05. Changing his vote to a rejec-
tion would not alter this outcome. Finally, misreporting his type and
pretending to be type tH would “turn on” the blocking plan, but this
would yield an expected utility 0.25 · 5.2 + 0.75 · 1 = 2.05, so he is at a
best response by telling the truth.
• Agent 1 of type tH joins the blocking plan in this equilibrium, and his
expected utility from doing so is 0.25 · 5.2 + 0.75 · 5 = 5.05, which is
also his status-quo expected utility. Thus, he would not benefit from
rejecting the blocking plan. Misreporting his type would “turn off” the
blocking plan, also resulting in the status-quo. Thus, he is also at a
best response.
• As for agent 2, he updates his interim beliefs using µ and the equilib-
rium strategy of agent 1 conditioning on the fact that coalition {1, 2}
is being formed. His conditional expected utility from accepting the
blocking plan is simply 6− 5.2. That is, he learns from having to vote
that the state is tH and that coalition {1, 2} has been called to exchange
one unit of the first good for 5.2 units of money; in no other realiza-
tion of µ he is part of the blocking plan. Therefore, if he accepts the
blocking plan when invited, he ends up with the bundle (1, 4.8). which
is better than what he would get from the status-quo by rejecting (the
bundle (0.25, 8.7)).
25
Note finally how in this example the weak inequalities in the objection
make a big difference. That is, while we have shown that x is not in the
randomized mediated core, we claim that it is in its weak version defined by
objections that use strict inequalities for every type. To see this, note that
because of incentive compatibility, if one improves type tH strictly, type tL
will also want to join. This means that he needs to be part of the blocking
plan and also strictly improve, which renders improving the buyer impossible.
6 Relationship to Durability
We close the paper by relating our approach to durability. In their analy-
sis of interim efficiency, Holmstro¨m and Myerson [7] point out that agents
may sometimes discard an interim (incentive) efficient allocation in favor of
another allocation.13 Their notion of durability is meant to formalize the
following:
“The essential idea .... is that an incentive compatible decision
rule δ should be considered durable iff the individuals in the econ-
omy would never unanimously approve a change from δ to any
other decision rule.” (Holmstro¨m and Myerson ([7], p. 1811))
Their actual definition of durability proceeds as follows. Given an al-
location x and an alternative feasible allocation y, they consider a voting
game Γx(N, (Ti)i∈N , y) as in our Subsection 3.2, in which type reports are
made after it is determined whether or not y is unanimously accepted. An
allocation x is said to endure y if there exists an equilibrium in which y
is rejected in every state. Since there always exists a Bayesian equilibrium
in which everyone rejects the alternative because they do not expect to be
pivotal, it becomes necessary to refine the equilibrium notion. They do this
by appealing to some of the conditions used in defining a trembling hand
perfect equilibrium. An allocation x ∈ A∗ is said to be durable if it endures
every alternative mechanism in A. Thus, a durable allocation has the prop-
erty that for every alternative, there exists an equilibrium rejection of that
alternative.
To compare our approach with durability, we apply the stability notion
implicit in Γx of Subsection 3.2 to the grand coalition. An allocation x ∈ A∗
13This phenomenon should be seen as an important consequence of incomplete informa-
tion since it is, of course, impossible in the complete information setting.
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is said to be resilient to grand coalition voting , or simply resilient if there is
no equilibrium rejection of x in a voting game Γx(N, (Ti)i∈N , y).
Using the proof of Proposition 2 applied to S = N , it is easy to see that
every resilient allocation is interim incentive efficient. In general, the other
implication does not hold; to see this, note that one can find an event E,
proper subset of T , over which the relevant types enjoy an improvement.
It is true, though, that a uniformly incentive compatible interim incentive
efficient allocation is resilient (see Dutta and Vohra [4]).
The reader will notice that our notion of resilience seems to be more faith-
ful to the idea described by the above Holmstro´m-Myerson quote. A resilient
allocation has the property that there is no equilibrium in which the alterna-
tive is ever unanimously accepted in place of the given status-quo. To meet
the durability test it is enough that there exist a (trembling-hand perfect)
equilibrium such that in every positive probability state the alternative is
rejected. It does not rule out the possibility that there is also an equilibrium
in which the alternative is accepted. Clearly, if there exists no equilibrium
(perfect or not) in which the alternative is accepted with positive probability,
then provided an equilibrium exists, it must involve a rejection of the alter-
native in each (positive probability) state. In this sense, a resilient allocation
is durable. But the converse need not be true. This can be illustrated by the
example in section 9 of Holmstro¨m and Myerson [7] in which an inefficient
allocation is durable because there is an equilibrium in which the status-quo
endures the alternative. But there also exists, for an alternative that is an
interim improvement, an equilibrium in which the alternative is unanimously
accepted. Of course, this implies that the original allocation was not resilient.
The basic idea in our approach, given our interest in a cooperative solution
such as the core, is that a coalition may choose any feasible allocation as long
as it can be supported by an equilibrium. In particular, a coalition should be
able to resolve any coordination problem (potentially found in situations like
those in Holmstro¨m and Myerson’s [7] example of Section 9). Compared to
durability, this makes it easier to challenge a status-quo, and yields therefore
a smaller set of stable allocations. Not surprisingly, this may lead to prob-
lems of non-existence. But in studying the core, unlike efficient allocations,
this is a problem that we cannot avoid in general, anyway (see Vohra [15]).
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